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This is the third and final article in a series on
property rights. In the previous two articles we saw
how conflicts often emerge during the transition from
one set of legal or social institutions to another. In this
article we consider how such challenges helped spark
a prolonged civil war in Sri Lanka, and how they might
finally be resolved now that peace has been realized.
The seeds of Sri Lanka's recent conflict were sown
by British colonial governments in the early 19th
century. Unlike their Dutch and Portuguese pre-
decessors the British were not content to merely
control the island's main ports, and launched a
campaign of conquest against the indigenous Kandyan
Kingdom. In place of the Kandyan system of land
tenure, which stressed intergenerational equity and
collective labor for the maintenance of public works,
the British established a highly expropriative system
designed to redistribute land from peasant farmers to
wealthy plantation owners. Public grazing lands and
undeveloped jungle were claimed by the crown and
granted freely to wealthy natives and British nationals.
Farmers were routinely compelled to prove title to
their land under threat of eviction. Traditional taxes on
agricultural production were increased dramatically,
with those who failed to pay forced to surrender their
land.
Even those smallholder farms that remained intact
suffered under the new legal system. Draught animal
populations were devastated by the loss of grazing
land, while massive deforestation severely impacted
the quality of both water and soil. A growing number
of landless and impoverished farm workers threatened
political instability, which forced the government to
establish a new system of land grants designed to
encourage settlement in the vast Dry Zone of the North
and the East. Unfortunately, this system succeeded
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only at the cost of increasing that region's population
density, far beyond what traditional irrigation systems
could support.
Independence in 1948 affected the politics of
expropriation, but not its primacy in economic life.
The critical divisions in Sri Lankan society quickly
moved from class to ethicity, as the two major parties
competed for the favor of the ethnic Sinhalese
majority. The United National Party (UNP) promised
laissez faire and low taxes, with the Sri Lankan
Freedom Party (SLFP) promising state promotion of
industry. But neither party promised much of anything
to the ethnic Tamil communities occupying the Dry
Zone perimeter.
In 1972 the SLFP passed a sweeping land reform
that capped individual ownership at 50 acres, and
seized massive amounts of land from the plantation
sector. By 1975, the government controlled 22 percent
of the island's arable land, most of which it promised
to redistribute back to the peasants. Brule (2006),
investigated these efforts and determined that they
were overseen by “patronage machines” and showed
a remarkable bias towards influential Sinhalese.
Ultimately, only 12 percent of the land grants were
made to the genuinely landless, and of these very few
were awarded to Tamils.
After regaining power in 1977, the UNP countered
with a program of Dry Zone resettlement that
demonstrated the same pattern of ethnic bias in land
grants. These efforts were fiercely opposed by Tamil
leaders who saw Sinhalese colonization of the Dry
Zone as a confiscation of their homeland. These
objections found no home in either major party. While
it might be imagined that a competitive democracy
would offer some protection from the worst abuses of
state power, in Sri Lanka it seemed only to fuel the
flames of racial animosity.
In 1983 these passions erupted into civil war. Over
the next 26 years this conflict would claim the lives of
nearly 70,000 people and maim more than 100,000. It
would also prove devastating to the economy of the
conflict region.
Citizens living under the control of the rebel
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were
subject to widespread extortion and theft. Illegal taxes
were levied on business transactions and public
servant salaries. Houses and public buildings were
captured for use as barracks. Muslims were left
particularly vulnerable, as the LTTE evicted all
Muslims from the city of Jaffna and seized many
Muslim-owned farms elsewhere.  
Consistent with economic theory, this collapse in
personal and property security resulted in a massive
decrease in investment. Unable to secure the rewards
of their labor, citizens in the conflict region stopped
building for the future and started focusing on short-
term survival. In the Batticaloa District, where fighting
was particularly fierce, the total number of economic
enterprises declined from 2,485 to 2,018 during the
first two decades of war, while savings rates turned
sharply negative, finally reaching -14.3 percent in
2004.  
The LTTE's defeat in 2009 signaled the end of
hostilities, but not of property rights uncertainty in the
conflict area. Thousands of families were displaced
during the conflict and continue to face considerable
challenges in reclaiming their old lives. While fleeing
violence and natural disaster, these families abandoned
not only their homes and farmland, but also valuable
assets such as farming and fishing equipment. Many
also lost the deed to their property, and with it their
right to enjoy government agricultural supports. Local
government offices are often unable to produce timely
duplicates.  
Critically, many of these families are likely to
experience difficulty in obtaining credit. A survey by
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009), determined that
many internally displaced families financed their
period of displacement by selling jewelry. This is
troubling, because jewelry has become a foundational
element of the Sri Lankan financial system, as
evidenced by a survey conducted last summer of 51
paddy farmers in Batticaloa District. It found that 19
had used jewelry as collateral for a loan in the most
recent growing season, nearly three times as many as
had used their land. 
This widespread reliance on alternative sources of
collateral reflects a longstanding weakness in property
rights policy. Nearly 70 percent of smallholder farms
still operate under grants from the National Land
Development Ordinance. LDO permit holders are
prohibited from selling their land, and can only use
their permits as collateral at an approved lender. Such
lenders are typically rare in rural areas.
With the end of hostilities signaling a new
beginning for Sri Lanka's economic development, it
may be prudent to hasten existing efforts to privatize
LDO land. Complementary efforts to rebuild damaged
infrastructure and improve the service of local
administrative offices could go a long way towards
rehabilitating the conflict area. However, policymakers
must remain mindful of Sri Lanka's troubled history,
and work to ensure that property law does not once
again become a battleground for ethnic politics.  
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